Photo of the Day

Vladimir Putin and NATO chief Jaap de Hoop Scheffer (Courtesy of Kommersant)

Vladimir and George talk about the Missile Shield : The "phony" Cold War draws to a close

Significant progress was made yesterday at the G8 summit in Germany during the meeting between George Bush and Vladimir Putin on the issue of the US plans for the deployment of an ABM system in Europe. But despite the relief that the discussion has caused by taking any "Cold War" analogies off the table, the US ABM shield issue is far from over, and many questions still remain which have little hope for an answer at the moment.

But the most important development is the fact that Russia now accepts the need for close cooperation on the US ABM deployment by its borders; it thus acknowledges that the US and Russia have common threats in the Middle East, particularly Iran. A cooperation with the US on missile defense from Iran, amongst others, also suggests that Russia is making more steps toward the US position on Iran's nuclear weapons development. A direction rooting for faster UN Security Council action against Iran.

With regard to Russia's offer to host the radar part of the system at its leased base in Azerbaijan, many questions still remain unanswered. The ABM system that the US is planning to deploy in Europe, apart from Navy-based US cruisers consists of a radar-base in the Czech Republic and a missile interceptor system to be installed in Poland. Russia opposes both of these bases. The Azerbaijan proposal offers to relocate the radar to a Russian-based radar system already in place there since 1985 under a long-term lease, under supervision from both the US and Russia. With regard to the missile interceptors, Russia's position is not entirely clear.

The New York Times reports Putin suggesting the missile interceptors could be located in US Aegis cruisers (presumably in the North Sea, or event the Baltic Sea). The US Aegis cruisers have recently been reequipped to host systems with the capabilities to shoot down short to medium range ballistic missiles (such as those that the US European shield is aimed against) as part of the US Global ABM shield system. Another proposal initiated by the US, as the Financial Times reports would be for the UK to host the missile interceptors. The newspaper reports that Russia has also expressed potential support for the UK option.

If the US does agree with a radar in Azerbaijan and missile interceptors in the UK, it would be too clear of a diplomatic victory for Russia, and it is highly unlikely that the US will give up its ideas of shield stations in Eastern Europe for any reasons whatsoever. But Russia has already offered to put all the recent heated rhetoric on the back burner if its proposals are accepted. For the US and NATO this a a sign of relief, as Russia's decision to aim missiles on Poland and the Czech Republic began to cause headaches about additional arms needed in those countries to protect them from Russia. Russia's attempted withdrawal from the CFE treaty and the intermediate range missiles treaty could also be halted, depending on the US interest in the Azerbaijan option.

For the first time the world is seeing Russia's thought-through diplomatic game being played out. It started in Munich, and the goal since then was to cause rifts within the EU and NATO, and generate the biggest amount of concerns among all of Russia's Western partners. The message from Russia was clear: "our opinion is not being noticed; if the situation continues, Russia will have to take action to get its opinion visible". By no means was this a "three-month" cold war; in the first meeting of the leaders of the confronting sides, significant progress was made, and the two were more than happy to continue constructive discussion.

The next meeting between the two in Main in early July will serve to hopefully finalize the details of the Russian-US cooperation on the US ABM shield in Europe. The proposals have not yet been fully analyzed by the two sides to make any forward-looking remarks. For now the ball is in the US court, and within time senior military experts and national security advisers should make clear statements with regard to the viability of the Russian proposal. As of today, the US has, in the words of George Bush and his national security adviser Steve Hadley only expressed "its interest" with the proposal. But it still is too soon to say the confrontation between Russia and the US is over on the ABM shields; not to forget the "diametrically opposed" positions with regard to Kosovo, and democracy.

For the recent developments of the US ABM story see this blog's earlier posts

Compressing the Spring

The US plans to deploy its ABM systems have dominated in the posts for this blog, and rightfully so. This week was filled with related events, threats, interviews regarding the ABM deployment. I firmly believe that this issue will be the dominant issue in the diplomatic classic East-West confrontation in the months to come; with Putin extremely determined to end his presidency with a firm assertion that Russia has the ability to protect its interests, no matter what.

On Monday Robert Gates during his visit to Moscow met with President Putin and other officials to discuss US plans to deploy the ABM complex, and most importantly to offer cooperation on this issue: a potential linking of Russian and US systems and the ability for Russia to initiate inspection checks to the newly-built facilities. These plans were publicly rejected by Russia's newly-appointed Minister of Defense Anatoliy Serdyukov and Mr. Ivanov (Russia's first-vice-premier). Russia continues to remain skeptical that Iran posesses any type of threat to Russia and to Europe. Similarly, the US, in the face of Ms. Rice has called Russia's concerns over plans to deploy the ABM systems as "ludicrous", the New York Times reported.

In his annual address to parliament, President Putin made it clear that Russia will respond immediately to US plans by withdrawing from the Adapted Conventional Armed Forces Treaty in Europe, which was based on an earlier treaty of 1990 during the dissolution of the Cold War and the Soviet Union. Russia's claims are that it is the only nation to have fully ratified the treaty and refuses to continue to fulfill its obligations unless other members (specifically NATO members) ratify it. NATO today has declared its surprise over such actions as it believes Russia was never fulfilling its promises under the treaty.

Because of numerous confusions in the press, it is important to go back and determine the realities of the treaties. An adapted copy of both treaties (1990) and (1999) can be found on the Arms Control Association Websites. The New York Times reports today that:

The agreement in question, the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, known by the initials C.F.E., was signed in 1990 by the N.A.T.O. nations and the nations of the former Warsaw Pact, including Russia. It required the reduction and relocation of much of the main battle equipment then located along the former east-west dividing line, including tanks, artillery pieces, armored vehicles and attack aircraft. It also established an inspection regime.

Under the treaty, more than 50,000 pieces of military equipment were converted or destroyed by 1995. With its initial ambitions largely achieved, it was renegotiated in 1999, adding a requirement that Russia withdraw its forces from Georgia and Moldova, two former Soviet republics where tensions and intrigue with Moscow run high.

The fact of "force withdrawal" remains very controversial. NATO members in 2002 had accepted that Russia fulfilled all of its requirements under the treaty, specifically regarding the fact of the withdrawal of TPE (treaty prohibited weapons) from Georgia and Moldova and other territories. Russia claims that its obligations essentially stop here, and a withdrawal of forces is a gesture of goodwill; NATO members claim that Russia made promises to withdraw its troops also. The treaty was originally signed to ensure the collective security of Europe and security from a "blitzkrieg-type" attack when one state would concentrate a large number of weapons on another's border. Thus, severe caps on TPEs were implemented (specifically tanks, jet fighters, light-armored vehicles, cannons, etc.) From this, troop presence would not be an issue to collective security, neither would the US ABM bases (a clear missile deterrent system).

In addition to the above, Russia's attempt to withdraw from the treaty is set to completely confuse all negotiating processes, as the treaty seems to be read differently in every country. With Russia having ratified it but slow on implementation, and NATO, having not ratified it accusing Russia of slow progress. Even before Russia's announcement, the Guardian reports that:

The Bush administration has this week been struggling to convince sceptical European partners that the missile shield is a good idea.

In an interview yesterday, Germany's deputy foreign minister, Gernot Erler, revealed that at least six allies, including Germany, raised doubts about the project at a Nato meeting last week — amid fears of another cold war on European soil.

The CFE treaty is not the first treaty Russia has threatened to withdraw from. Russian officials initially opened up their protests by suggesting likely withdrawal from the treaty limiting production of medium-range missiles. It is a paradox that both treaties are virtually outdated, with Russia and US scrapping their medium-range missiles, while six other countries still possess them. With regard to the CFE treaty, the militarization and force-withdrawals have mostly been achieved already, and Russia remains the beneficiary under the treaty due to its massive territory. While other countries had to scrap their weapons, Russia shifted its TPEs beyond the limit-free Urals in Siberia. Yet the treaties are highly symbolic and are the essential foundations of collective security in the post Cold War period.

The Financial Times in its editorial reports that, the US was the first country that began breaking such treaties, through its 2001 unilateral withdrawal from the ABM treaty:

However, Thursday’s decision is strategically important because it signals Russia’s growing readiness to tear up the post-1990 diplomatic order. Moscow believes today’s strong Russia can revisit the deals done in the 1990s by a weak Russia. The Kremlin also argues the US has repeatedly acted unilaterally, including over Iraq and over recent plans for Czech and Polish missile defence bases. If the US can set aside bilateral or multilateral pacts, says Moscow, so can Russia.

These developments take the world into perilous waters. While there is no open ideological conflict between east and west, there are deep differences over democracy and the rule of law. It will be dangerous if these disputes prevent Russia, the European Union and the US co-operating on matters of mutual interest, including energy, the war against terrorism and nuclear non-proliferation.

The US is entitled to look after its own security. But it must accept security is often easier to build in partnership with others than alone. America, not Russia, was the first to pull out of a cold war arms pact when in 2001 it abandoned the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty. Washington’s recent effort to explain its missile defence plans to sceptical European states, including Russia, is long overdue.

Russia is behaving irresponsible in a diplomatic sense and is severely threatening collective security in Europe. But the US is doing the same, yet indirectly. Analysts have rightly pointed out that withdrawal from both treaties will make Russia's position worse: it has barely the right capital to finance development and deployment of medium-range ballistic missiles, and to engage in a large-scale rearmament of its European part. These capabilities are dwarfed by 10 times by the US military budget. But clearly Russia has no choice. Its policy of countering NATO's dominance must start now, at a time when relations are moderately cool. The fact of no ideological difference between the East and the Wets means no serious threat to confrontation will occur. Yet, it is worrisome if Russia and the US scrap its commitments to security in Europe, especially given the experience of the 20th century . We are living in a different world, but relations among countries sour easily, and alliances and counter-alliances form just as fast.

The end goal of its diplomatic game is not to scrap its commitment to European security, but to make the rest of Europe aware that such issues as the ABM deployment if pushed unilaterally by the US without NATO approval could bring instability. Yet, the threats that Russia has made show that it is engaged in almost full-scale bluff, the US knows and understands this, Germany understands this even better. This poker game is very long, and the stakes may rise with every day, unless serious negotiations start soon, Russia will turn its bluff into serious actions. If treaty withdrawal will occur, there is a marginal prospect of US rearmament in Europe, quite an unhappy prospect.

Update: The New York TImes on US ABM in Europe

In Friday's issue, the New York Times discusses the plans of the US to engage in closer talks with Russia about a linking of US and Russian ABM systems in the future:

The package includes American offers to cooperate on developing defense technology and to share intelligence about common threats, as well as to permit Russian officials to inspect the future missile bases.

American officials said the initiatives were proposed at least in part at the urging of European allies, and reflected an acknowledgment at the highest levels of the Bush administration that it had not been agile in dealing with Russia — and with some NATO allies — on its plan to place defensive missiles and radar in Poland and the Czech Republic.

The offers of cooperation will be laid out for Russian officials in the coming weeks in a series of high-level meetings being scheduled by senior American officials, in particular Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates and Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice. If those talks go well, they will continue over the summer and fall between President Bush and President Vladimir V. Putin.

However the New York Times continues to note the ultimate reasons behind Polish and Czech motivation to so readily accept the systems on their territory:

The missile defense proposals for central Europe also have become a proxy issue for Russian officials who still rankle at American and NATO expansion east after the collapse of the Soviet Union.

Yet even among some officials in Poland and the Czech Republic, support for the two missile defense bases has more to do with binding the United States closer to their capitals against a future Russian threat than about deterring a future Iranian missile threat.

American officials have not announced the timetable for the coming talks. But in Moscow, Igor Ivanov, the secretary of Russia’s Security Council, said that Mr. Gates was due there for Kremlin meetings on Monday and that Ms. Rice would visit in May.

It is also clear that the US initially played on Polish and Czech wishes when choosing th location of the system. The US places its ABM system not where it would most likely yield the best "defensive" results from the start: the system will not be able to protect new EU members, such as Romania and Bulgaria, and long-term partners of NATO and the EU - Belgium (it is a paradox that NATO headquarters are located in Brussels).

It is far-fetched that Russia will follow the US's attempt to further promote its system which traces its start from a call Mr. Bush made to Mr. Putin several weeks ago. Russia has no threats that would be deterred by the US ABM system, the US undoubtedly has. And with all honesty, Poland and the Czech Republic do not share those threats.

The US is acting accordingly in building up credibility for its system by attempting to explore all the options on the table. If it continues to do so, then it will most likely accomplish its task. It is also evident that Russia is succeeding at its favorite game of all-out bluff by threatening to start burning bridges with Europe and the US. It is very difficult for the US State Department to discern what is really the opinion of the Kremlin and how far it is likely to go. The approaching presidential elections are being followed by an aggressive anti-American campaign in the media. Add on top of that Iran, where Russia's true position continues to balance on the wire between pure-play business interests and the real pursuit of building an Iran-Syrian foundation in the region, and the situation become too darn confusing.

The US must be extremely careful. Such issues have the ability to bring outrage in the eyes of key Russian MPs and most importantly key Kremlin administration officials. As for Russia, its only hope is to continue to stir the feelings of the Europeans, who have been placed in the very uncomfortable position of mediator. German social-democrats and a possible victory of Ms. Royal in France could add more eggs in Russia's basket when negotiating with the US on the issue. It is clear, however, that the US ABM question will be active for the next six months at least, thanks to Russia's diplomatic strategy.

ABM Update : Patriot Missiles Again? [Updated April 20th]

The Financial Times reports that the US has recently taken another step forward in progressing its ABM technologies in Europe by opening up an official dialog with NATO members as well as Russia's representatives in Europe:

Thursday, Konstantin Totskiy, Moscow’s ambassador to Nato, underlined Russia’s concerns, but also welcomed the meeting as the start of a long-awaited “dialogue”.

The US delegation argued that the proposed sites in Poland and the Czech Republic would allow the system to cover all but a handful of Nato allies.

The system, which is principally designed to protect the continental US, already uses bases in California and Alaska. According to maps circulating among Nato officials, only Turkey and parts of Greece, Bulgaria and Romania would be outside the system’s protection once additional interceptor missiles were installed in Poland and radar in the Czech Republic.

Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, Nato secretary-general, is enthusiastic about winning Nato support for a complementary “bolt-on” system that would use Patriot missiles and Aegis radar to protect Turkey and other parts of south-east Europe from shorter-range missiles from Iran. <...>

In Moscow, however, Sergei Ivanov, Russia’s first deputy prime minister, said he saw “no grounds” for co-operation with the US on a joint missile defence system.

Once again, I would like to reiterate that I am not a specialist on radar missile defense but it seems strange that Bulgaria and Romania, countries closest to Poland would not be under the protection of the new system.

Second, I do not understand why the United States is not engaged in a dialog with Turkey about deployment of its ABM system there. Geographically, this region still allows to track incoming missiles from Iran, it is also much closer to Iran, and potentially other troublesome countries. Also, Turkey, in the past, has hosted a large variety of US weapons systems.

Russia threatening new cold war over missile defence

In yesterday's article, the Guardian highlighted the intensity of the debate over US ABM systems in Europe. Despite President Bush's recent telephone call to President Putin about potential cooperation on the issue and even participation in the ABM project, the Kremlin administration and especially the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Parliament have not responded favorably to such propositions. The Guardian argues that the probabilities of a renewed cold-war, on a much lower scale, are increasing and that Russia is seriously looking to diving into another arms race. Excerpts of the article are presented below:

The Kremlin has not publicly spelt out its plans. But defence experts said its response is likely to include upgrading its nuclear missile arsenal so that it is harder to shoot down, putting more missiles on mobile launchers, and moving its fleet of nuclear submarines to the north pole, where they are virtually undetectable.

Russia could also bring the new US silos within the range of its Iskander missiles launched potentially from the nearby Russian enclave of Kaliningrad, they add.

In an interview with the Guardian, the Kremlin's chief spokesman, Dmitry Peskov, said Moscow felt betrayed by the Pentagon's move. "We were extremely concerned and disappointed. We were never informed in advance about these plans. It brings tremendous change to the strategic balance in Europe, and to the world's strategic stability." <...>

Defence experts say there is little doubt that the real target of the shield is Russia. "The geography of the deployment doesn't give any doubt the main targets are Russian and Chinese nuclear forces," General Vladimir Belous, Russia's leading expert on anti-ballistic weaponry, told the Guardian. "The US bases represent a real threat to our strategic nuclear forces." <...>

The same day Russia ruled out cooperating with the US over the shield. "Despite certain signals received in recent days from the US side ... I see no political foundation for it," said Sergei Ryabkov, a foreign ministry spokesman. Moscow now had little choice but to take the bases "into account in our strategic planning", he said.

Analysts said there was a common feeling in Russia that the US had reneged on an agreement after the collapse of the Soviet Union to abandon cold war politics. "Cold war thinking has prevailed, especially on the western side," Yevgeny Myasnikov, a senior research scientist at Moscow's Centre for Arms Control, told the Guardian. "Russia has been deeply disappointed by what has happened after 1991. Nato started to expand, and the US started to think it had won the cold war. We had hoped for a partnership. But it didn't happen."

The last paragraph perfectly illustrates the reasons for the behavior of the Russian side. The historic positions of Poland and, to a lesser extent, the Czech Republic to oppose any signs of dominance and political power of their eastern neighbor, (while also watching out for Germany) heighten Russia's concerns. Russia has two clear means which it can pursue, and which may guarantee a halt in the militarization of Eastern Europe.

First of all it should prolong the process and force a long period of negotiations, diplomatic notes of concern, to drag the issue well into 2008, when changes in the US administration and a most likely changing US policy may overturn the ABM initiation process. But, with candidates such as McCain and Clinton this is very unlikely. Second, it should continue stirring up the grievances of the European nations toward the US's poorly implemented foreign policy, as well as toward the seemingly power-hungry new EU members, Poland especially.

Both routes, however, will most likely postpone the debate to a further time. As the world stand right now, Eastern Europe continues to fear its neighbor; Russia continues to maintain, perhaps unwillingly, its imperial image, and the US is desperate to regain the power lost under the collapsed foreign policy of the Bush administration. And what better way to do it, then by serving as the guarantor of security in Europe.

A crucial debate on Europe’s anti-missile defences

Excerpts from a commentary of the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs - Sergei Lavrov for the Financial Times regarding the debate over installation of US ABM systems in Poland and the Czech Republic:

The plan by the United States to deploy parts of its missile defence system in Europe has kicked off debate on an issue of vital importance to the continent: whether Europe needs anti-missile defences at all. This concerns everybody and the open debate testifies to the healthy state of European politics.

Russia is ready to take part in these discussions at all levels and in any format. One can only welcome the agreement reached recently by presidents Vladimir Putin and George W. Bush to hold consultations on the subject, in the context of collaboration on our joint security. We are ready to respond positively to any positive signals coming from the US.

What is the Russian position? First of all, for us – and for many others in Europe – it is unacceptable for anyone to use the continent as their own strategic territory. Any unilateral anti-­missile projects would fundamentally alter the continent’s geo-strategic landscape. It would also be an affront to all Europeans, as it would devalue the continent’s pan-European and multi­national organisations – including Nato and the European Union – which we were told until just recently were the keystones of European security.

We favour an integrated approach to solving the problems of the Euro-­Atlantic region – in a trilateral format, including Russia, the EU and the US. No side should have any suspicions about what the other two partners are doing. It solves the problem of maintaining the integrity of European policy and safeguarding it from dangerous fragmentation. It would also streng­then the transatlantic bond – but in an inclusive way, with the participation of Russia and other countries that do not belong to Nato or the EU. <...>

Fifth, discussion of a missile shield in Europe marks a watershed in European politics. Nothing can replace co-operation in security, which demands such a high level of mutual trust, or in overcoming the past and rebuilding the unity of the continent.

Either we take a decisive step forward, or European politics will go into reverse, bearing out the fears of those who saw in the expansion of Nato and the EU the potential for new dividing lines to be drawn in Europe.

Crumbling Bridges

The expansion of the US ABM shield into Europe, especially into Poland and the Czech Republic, will further shift the balance of security and power in the world over to the side of a single country, a single system of development. The United States is driving a wedge into the current relations between two systems of power in the world, which may be the easiest strategy to ensure the dominance of its system. The United States is pursuing its own national security interests, and it should be applauded for doing so; but its status as a global power and leader of a dominant system gives it responsibility for the security balance in the world as well. Global security and national security are not always intertwined, sometimes there are tradeoffs.

An existing definition of a superpower gives it three characteristics:
· Global economy. An economy with efficient multi-trillion dollar capital markets, which affects significantly the capital markets of other countries. An economy with extensive capacity for overcoming recessions and continuous expansions without hurting the combined wealth of its population.
· Full military self-sufficiency. In other words, the capacity to produce all types of weapons without any significant outside help (whether in terms of knowledge or material resources).
· Ability to impact almost any part of the world, whether economically, politically, militarily, socially; this may be for reasons of promoting a country’s own values, or for protecting national interests.

Despite the fact that today’s global powers are considered to be the US, UK, Germany, France, China, Russia, and Japan, the only country in the world which fully possesses the above characteristics is the United States. It is also apparent that the UK, Germany and France rely to different degrees on the United States for their military production needs, most obviously as a by-product of NATO. The UK, German, and French economies are very heavily intertwined with that of the US (although globalization is reducing the importance of this aspect). Some would debate the alignment of political views of the European countries with the US, but the views converge on most issues of national and global security in the long-run. Consequently, it seems evident that the US is the dominant country in the US/UK/France/Germany system.

The remaining countries are China, Russia, and Japan. Japan, while clearly not tied as strong to the US, as the European countries, is of a similar nature. However, its only strength is an independent global economy, which does not give it much leeway as a system on its own.

Russia and China, to various degrees, possess all of the three characteristics at a “discount” to the scale of the US (except for Russian military self-sufficiency, roughly on par with the US). Yet, these countries are undoubtedly not aligned with each other on their global outlooks; their national interests conflict each other more often than not. China and Russia have enough power and independence to be enlisted as two additional systems.

The ideological differences between the three systems are not as dominant as they were during the Cold War, but it is important to note them; each system’s ideological structure is a variation of capitalism. The US system, a form of progressive democratic capitalism; the Russian system a form of democratic capitalism with a large interest of a centralized government, and the Chinese system a form of capitalism controlled by a highly centralized government system.

The presence of three systems ensures a multi-polar world, with a significant dominance of one system. The realpolitik nature of the relationships amongst the systems makes the end goal complete dominance.

The actions of the US in the past 15 years thus seem perfectly obvious and justified, as the actions of a system trying to win full dominance. In an environment where full-scale military conflicts are impossible, the only way to beat a system is to contain it enough to continue reaping its resources, but preventing it from exerting influence upon your system.

The expansion of NATO to cover the entire Western border of Russia, the stirring up of ex-Soviet republics and support for their inclusion into the US system, are tools to prevent all Russia exporting its influence. The US system’s corporate expansion into Russia’s key assets (oil, gas, mining) and prevention of Russian corporate expansion into global downstream markets is the simultaneous reaping of resources and barrier set-up to prevent reciprocal influence. Of course, companies that attempt to expand into Russia’s key resources are not governmental companies, but the US system promotes indirectly an expansion of the US system’s economy into Russia, while promoting the barriers for Russian corporations in Europe. This has happened with Gazprom’s attempts to access the downstream market, Rosneft’s (Russian oil giant) failed attempt to get full-scale access to European capital markets. In return, Shell, BP, Exxon-Mobil, are all present in significant oil and gas projects on Russian territory.

It is self-explanatory why Russia promotes, almost openly, the expelling of foreign corporations from its strategic assets. It sees a threat to its national security. Tying these actions with an authoritarian regime is an attempt to shift blame; Russia’s actions if it were to ignore total foreign dominance of its key assets would be considered self-destructive and overly loyal to an indefinite country.

The primary reason why Mr. Khodorkovsky, hailed by many in 2004 as the champion of Russian democracy, is sitting in jail, is that he exerted political ambitions while simultaneously trying to sell the nation’s top oil firm (with a 20% stake in the total oil assets of Russia) to ExxonMobil. In response to warnings from the Kremlin, Mr. Khodorkovsky claimed that he was all-powerful. No government in the world likes to be spat on by a high-stakes businessman. The Kremlin was in a position where it was obliged to establish a majority (by no means complete) control over the nation’s strategic assets, if it wanted to have leeway over the economy, rather than be a subsidiary to Wall Street/London City. The United States behaved in the same way to the acquisition attempt by CNOOC (China) of Unocal (a mid-size oil exploration company).

Similarly, actions of an expanding NATO, under any pretext, are seen by Russia as a threat to its national security. Russia does not have many existing resources, apart from strong relations with several European countries, Middle East and Iran, as well as its expanding economy and self-sufficient military system. It attempts to hold on to its existing resources and build on them at all costs. The presence of US ABM shields in Europe served, as US generals claim, to locate and destroy only a few dozen rockets, will not be a threat to Russia within the next ten years. But, a shield against ten rockets can be expanded to 50, 100, and so on. Once the resource is there, no additional hurdles such as the need to gain global consent, or investments into infrastructure are required – simple expansion is easier and cheaper. Russia is concerned about what guarantees exist that the shield will not be anti-Russian in twenty years.

The US in 1999 guaranteed Russia that NATO would stop expanding, but the expansion continues. Russia feels it is being ignored, being given false promises, when NATO is expanding, and when new NATO members carry large-scale projects set to defend the US from multiple-nuclear-warhead attacks; attacks, which could currently come only from Russia and China.

It is of course unquestioned that the club of countries that could threaten the US with weapons is expanding with passing time. India and Pakistan, who each possess such weapons in the Kashmir “powder-keg” zone is a worry for the US especially. The relative weakness of the Pakistani regime, the closeness to a hotbed of terrorism in the face of Afghanistan, the ever-expanding Indian economy, every year becoming more and more tied with US businesses mean that a conflict in the region will deal a powerful blow to American interests in that region. Iran currently does not have such weapons, but will in the near future. The shield will indeed protect the interests of the US system in the world from the rogue states, and give it much more negotiating power on the global arena, but no guarantees are in place as to the possible redirection or expansion of this shield, nor can these guarantees be given to Russia.

Russia will most likely be unwilling to pursues such guarantees; it will do all it can to prevent as much as possible the ABM shield in Poland and the Czech Republic. Another reason behind Russia’s attitude can be attributed to the fact that, over the past years, Russia has shut-down two radio-tracking bases, used in its defenses, in Cuba and Vietnam. The official reasoning was the inability to finance these two bases, whose cost was around $500 million annually; a reason which can be put into question, with Russia’s GDP having passed the $1 trillion mark, and simple government oil revenues hitting $200 billion. My assumption is that Russia was given certain guarantees, pushed to close down the bases. If this assumption stands, the expansion of the ABM shield (which includes radio-tracking bases) into Eastern Europe means Russia has given up too much, the promises made to it were false.

Many journalists and political analysts claim that Russia’s reaction to the establishment of the shield, gives Poland and the Czech Republic more reasons to ally with the US and create the ABM shields. First of all, this is an indirect affirmation of the ABM shield’s aim against Russia. Secondly, it is the US which is driving in the wedge between the two systems; the US is defending itself on a major scale, set to outpace the potential threat of an attack from a military superpower. The two systems are driven further apart.

Russia cannot continue agreeing with the expansion of the US system, if no guarantees will exist that the expansion will stop. Russia will most likely be forced to expand its own system at the expense of an alliance with the US. Neither the US system nor the Russian system will benefit from the greater wedge. It seems the US’s benefits from the implementation of the “sanitary cordon” around Russia will not outweigh the costs. The costs would be continued confrontation of the two systems, which would hamper the solution of the world’s global problems, expand the activities of unstable regimes, rogue states, which will pursue a double-game as they did during the Cold War.

Iran’s current double-game pursuit is the most obvious example. Neither Russia’s “all-clear” position, nor the US’s “restrict-all” approach is helpful, but as long as two positions remain, Iran remains in relative safety. Currently there is room for compromise, as the US system and Russia have a lot of mutually dependent issues that they could solve by compromising on Iran. But as time runs by, and relations continue to deteriorate, the compromising could stop. And Iran-s will pop-up all over the world like bamboo trees.

Bottom line: now is not too late to rethink the structure of inter-system relations. Neither system should dominate; each system has the responsibility to keep it that way.