You build Shields - We will build Rockets : Is Russia restoring the balance of Power or Distorting it?

Russia on Tuesday proceeded with a number of previously agreed upon actions to both affirm its stark opposition to any US ABM (Anti-Ballistic-Missile) complexes in Eastern Europe, and support its military status as a nation able to counter new developments from the United States. Parallel to that, Russia has proceeded to revamp the process associated with the conventional arms treaty which has caused a great deal of confusion ever since it was signed and ratified by Russia in 1999, but never ratified by the other European NATO-member states (Ukraine and Belarus ratified the treaty soon after 1999).

President Putin met the Portuguese prime-minister on Tuesday, whose country is set to take over the rotating presidency of the EU this year after Germany, to communicate Russia's stance on US ABM development in Europe as well as some unresolved issues between the EU and Russia, such as Polish meat. Russia also announced that it was calling upon the urgent meeting of Conventional Armed Forced in Europe (CFE) treaty members to discuss future actions. The same day, Russian Strategic Missile Forces stated that Russia's new inter-continental ballistic missile with multiple warheads had been tested. Although all three events are ultimately linked, the media has created a certain degree of confusion regarding the missile launch, presenting it specifically as a counter-measure to the current US plans and EU-Russia disagreements. The Associate Press originally cited Russian military expert Alexander Golts as saying: ''It seems to be a brand new missile. It's either a decoy or something that has been developed in complete secrecy".

Yet nothing about the rocket and plans to build it were new. The development is a response to US plans to distort the balance of power between Russian and US nuclear arsenals. Full-scale plans for development of the RS-24 rocket with multiple warheads began with the US withdrawal in 2002 from the Anti Ballistic Missile Treaty and with their plans to build a global ABM system (a part of which in Eastern Europe has caused so much debate). The same year Russia announced that it was forced to take actions to counter US military development to sustain its military superiority in case of a conflict, and began developing the RS-24 missile that has the capability to break through the new US ABM system.

The reason why Russia was forced to pursue such a course of action is outlined in Wednesday's Kommersant newspaper. The agreements signed between Russia and the US in 1993, which obliged both sides to cut their nuclear arsenals to 4250 warheads made Russia lose out in its military parity with the US, as these accords specified the destruction of ICBMs (intercontinental ballistic missiles) with multiple warheads (the foundation of the Russian nuclear arsenal). To counter the loss in superiority, Russia had to increase the amount of new mobile ICBM launchers (such as the 1997 built Topol M) and submarines carrying ICBMs, for which it had very little financing. The 2002 accords between Russia and the US obliged the sides to cut down their arsenals further below 2,200 warheads but did not specify the structure of the remaining arsenal like the 1993 accords. This allowed Russia to resume building ICBMs with multiple warheads, which is a much cheaper and efficient way to build up an ICBM arsenal, especially with Russia's small military budget and the US plans for an ABM Global missile shield. Tuesday's test was a long-sought process, yet the actual day of the test coinciding with harsh statements of Russian officials serve to give the testing a "show of force" motivation as well. Russia now plans to produce 20 such rockets annually and plans to increase its warhead arsenal up to 2000 warheads by 2015.

It is very important to note, that no treaties are being broken with the testing and the production of the rocket, and that the US departure from the ABM agreements in 2002 left Russia no choice but to strengthen the offensive side of its nuclear deterrent, much cheaper than building an analog of the US Global ABM shield. These new missiles are also not tied to a threat to Eastern Europe, as they are ICBMs with very broad ranges (specifically aimed at the US). A parallel development of a strong US Global ABM system and Russian ICBMs with multiple warheads will prolong the balance of power in nuclear deterrents according to the mutually assured destruction scenario, that has kept the world away from a nuclear war for almost sixty years.

Meanwhile Russia's actions to call for an emergency conference of the CFE treaty members is the continuation of Russia's actions to set forth a new set of agreements for Europe's armaments. Russia has grown very annoyed with the fact that it has so far been the only country to fully adhere to the treaty and that its obligations with the treaty have been tied by NATO members to a withdrawal of Russian military bases from Moldova and Georgia. It must be noted that the CFE treaty imposes caps on heavy military equipment placement in Europe (tanks, helicopters, artillery); military bases filled with regular troops do not violate its accords. Russia's anxiety about the treaty is also supported by the fast expansion of NATO toward its borders, which violated understandings reached in the late 1990-s between Russia, the US and other NATO members.

President Putin's recent successful visits to meet the heads of Austria, Luxembourg, and now Portugal, have been used to cement support for Russia's concerns about a new rearmament of Europe, associated with the deployment of the US ABM bases in Poland and the Czech Republic. The Russian president has already referred to US plans as creating a "powder keg" in Europe and provoking the start of an arms race. Most states in Europe with ruling social-democratic parties have expressed doubt in the need for the US shield, and most EU members have agreed that the US position for unilateral installment of such systems in Europe without constructive discussions with Russia was a very wrong path to take. The chairman of Germany's ruling Social Democrat Party Kurt Beck in a recent article for the International Herald Tribune has said: "if we are talking about common security then we need to have joint discussion on key means of attaining it", implying consensus within NATO itself (which does not exist today), and a discussion with Russia. He has also pointed out that:

Moreover, serious doubts have been expressed as to whether the defense system actually functions.

The United States has so far invested over $100 billion in the development of a defensive shield. That is a huge sum which, spent differently, could have achieved more for the security of the United States.

The world has arrived at a crossroads. It would be a ground-breaking decision if, acting in trans-Atlantic accord, we were to pave the way for a new round of global disarmament. In doing so, we would be sure of the support of the peoples of our countries and far beyond.

So far Russia's diplomatic efforts on the road to block US deployment of an ABM shield in Eastern Europe have proceeded rather successfully. As this blog said in previous posts on the issue, the goal of creating disagreements within NATO and the EU about the need for US ABM deployment has been achieved, with more European states expressing doubts on the need for such a defensive mechanism.

Russia will most likely not have the "veto" power on the issue of US ABM deployment in Eastern Europe, as the US side has said numerously, but what Russia hopes to achieve is that the European nations have "veto" power over it. The Russian position has always been to accept the US ABM deployment only unless there is consensus in NATO and the EU of a true need for such a system. The reasons behind Russia's anxiety are that the US shield is said to aim at Iran and North Korea, while having the ability to monitor the entire European part of Russia, where many strategically important structures are located. Russia has first of all expressed doubt that a need for such a shield exists, due to Iran's slim chances of developing ICBMs to target Europe within the next ten years, and second, it has found little support for the ABM shield to be placed in Poland and the Czech Republic over for example Turkey (where it would have a better "view" on the rogue states of the Middle East while not monitoring Russian territory).

As it looks from Russia's recent actions with regard to the CFE treaty, it may be initiating the start of discussions to draw up new treaties on arms in Europe; with the US current administration in urgent need to deploy the US ABM shield in Europe and so much confusion remaining over the CFE treaty, such discussions will most likely be backed by all sides and will be set to reduce the current deadlock associated with Russia's stronger diplomatic bargaining position compared to the 1990-s when the European security treaties were signed.

This topic has been carefully monitored by this blog, and it is an issue of utmost importance for Europe and the world, when treaties signed in the era of the cold war are outdated, and those signed in the 1990-s putting Russia at a disadvantage to its Western partners. Given a successful effort by Russia, Europe, and the US the world may see a whole new round of security treaties that would take into account the current geopolitical situation (for more information visit the previous posts on the US ABM issue below):

• Why Russia is so upset about the ABM in Europe?
• Compressing the Spring
• Update: The New York Times in US ABM in Europe
• ABM Update: Patriot Missiles Again?
• Russia threatening new cold war over missile defense
• A crucial debate on Russia's missile defenses
  

The Trouble with Kosovo

The month of May will see new and very important developments on the issue of Kosovo's independence from Serbia. Russia is strongly opposed to the current plan laid out by Marti Ahtisaari (pictured), which in Russia's opinion does not take into consideration the view of Serbia, of which Kosovo is currently a part of. In late April, Russian deputy minister for foreign affairs Mr. Titov reiterated that the Ahtisaari plan if put forward in the voting round of the Security Council would "not go through", implying Russian use of the veto. In recent days, the US, and its European partners, the main contributors to the current NATO contingent in Kosovo, have increased the tensions in the dispute by arguing that Russian veto will not stop Kosovo's independence. The Financial Times reports:

The US and the European Union are seeking to push through a United Nations resolution on Kosovo this month, warning Russia that if it vetoes any such measure it will be responsible for any resulting violence or instability in the province.

US and European officials hope that, despite recent friction between Russia and the west on a range of topics, Moscow will abstain rather than veto the plan.

“It would be quite a big step if Russia blocked a resolution of what is fundamentally a European issue,” said a senior British official.

Washington and Brussels believe that Russia should not have a strong say in the dispute resolution as its opposition will mean that NATO peacekeepers will bear the full brunt of violence that will result in Kosovo. It must be noted that almost all political analysts as well as the people behind the Ahtisaari plan acknowledge its serious flaws. Mr Ahtisaari explains the virtual elimination of Serbian participation in the plan with the fact that the gap amongst the countries (Kosovo and Serbia) is unbridgeable. Supporters of the plan claim that Kosovo will declare independence regardless of the result of negotiations in the UN, and that some EU countries and the US will almost certainly recognize Kosovo's independence. Kosovo's president, Fatmir Sijdu, extremely confident in the support of his European and US allies has recently affirmed that Kosovo is ready to "gain independence by the end of May".

Some Western analysts, such as Richard Holbroke, in a recent open-ed in the Wall Street Journal have heavily criticized the Russians for pursuing their own geopolitical goals, while not being that concerned with its long-term Slav "ally", Serbia:

Moscow's point about protecting "fraternal" Slav-Serb feelings is nonsense; everyone who has dealt with the Russians on the Balkans, as I did for several years, knows that their leadership has no feelings whatsoever for the Serbs. Russia is using Kosovo for its tactical advantage, as part of a strategy to reassert itself on the international stage. That is a legitimate goal, as long as Russia plays a constructive role -- but Moscow's recent behavior, from Georgia to Iran to some ugly domestic incidents, is not encouraging.

Russia claims that the bloodshed that the West is certain will occur, if the resolution takes any longer, is "blackmail" intended to shift responsibility for the conflict, of Russia did not approve in the first place.

Yet, the Kosovo problem is a rare issue where despite numerous secondary considerations that Russia is pursing, its publicized position of a mutually acceptable solution of the conflict is stronger (or at least less weak) than that of its Western counterparts. First of all, Russia is not that isolated in its stance. During the first round of consultations in the Security Council on Mr. Ahtisaari's plan for granting Kosovo internationally supervised sovereignty only four countries out of fifteen supported the plan in its current version. The current non-permanent members of the Security Council, South Africa, Ghana, Congo, and Indonesia have expressed their skepticism toward the potential precedent that the the Ahtisaari plan may have in international law.

Second, despite some claims set to deny Russia's participation on the basis that it will not bear the full brunt of violence if Kosovo does create tensions as a result of independence, Russia has, is, and will express its opinion on issues on European security, simply because it is a member of the broad European community. Events occurring in Europe are matters of national security for all members of the broad European community. Under the logic of some NATO and US officials only nations that have direct military participation in such stale conflicts should have exclusive rights to their resolution. The United Nations was in 1999 given the authority to decide the outcome of the Kosovo conflict, proposing otherwise would question the authority of the United Nations, and that has rarely led to promising outcomes.

Third, Russia would see benefits and threats to its current security in case of the Kosovo precedent, and thus has no clear reason to threaten the Ahtisaari plan on the basis of its own interests. On the one hand, the stale conflicts in Georgia and Moldova, where Russian peacekeepers are currently stationed, in the case of Kosovo being granted independence, would be easily resolved. A clear majority of the population of the TMR (Transdniester Moldovan Republic) and the South Osetiya and Abkhazia regions support their independence from Moldova and Georgia respectively, and most likely would support entry into Russia (something that the Russian government has indirectly hinted it would consider a big geopolitical victory on the post-Soviet landscape).

On the other hand the Kosovo precedent is a future threat to Russia. Russia's federal model of government, no matter how hard-lined under President Putin, maintains Autonomous Republics with strong feelings for greater autonomy and even independence. For the past decade Chechnya was such a region; the spread of such feelings throughout Russia's southern territories is not a distinct possibility. Tatarstan, an energy-rich republic within Russia, as well as the Kaliningrad enclave have been cited as possible candidates to leave Russia if such an opportunity becomes viable.

Finally despite claims that Russia's Slav "support" for Serbia is a false pretext, many have forgotten that Russia played a decisive role in ending the bombardments of Serbia, which would have continued for more than the 70+ days.

Russia's ambassador to London has expressed his surprise at the very aggressive efforts of the US and several EU countries to adopt the resolution of Kosovo's independence, noting that the process of constructing the plan has taken several years, and the acceptance of the plan, involving such fundamental issues should not occur in a matter of weeks.

Obviously the concern for NATO forces stationed in Kosovo about potential violence in the region in the case of Kosovo proclaiming its independence unilaterally is understandable. However, the reason for Kosovo's overly optimistic outlook on its rights as an independent state lies in the manner in which the US and EU members have approached the issue; most importantly Mr. Ahtisaari's lack of motivation to take the views of Serbia into consideration. It is also a mystery why the acceptance of the plan will not create violence stirred up by the Serbian side. Kosovo is aware of the harsh consequences if it were to go alone at its independence. As of now, the world is not ready to approve its independence without a UN mandate. Accepting the Ahtisaari plan like vetoing it will have an adverse result on the stability in the region and increase th probability of bloodshed.

The only option on the table is to postpone discussions and develop a plan that takes into consideration the deepest concerns of both sides and present it to Kosovo and Serbia as the only available solution. Kosovo's eventual independence may be evident, but it is better for it to occur with wide-spread support to reduce the negative impacts of such a precedent for future disputes.

Compressing the Spring

The US plans to deploy its ABM systems have dominated in the posts for this blog, and rightfully so. This week was filled with related events, threats, interviews regarding the ABM deployment. I firmly believe that this issue will be the dominant issue in the diplomatic classic East-West confrontation in the months to come; with Putin extremely determined to end his presidency with a firm assertion that Russia has the ability to protect its interests, no matter what.

On Monday Robert Gates during his visit to Moscow met with President Putin and other officials to discuss US plans to deploy the ABM complex, and most importantly to offer cooperation on this issue: a potential linking of Russian and US systems and the ability for Russia to initiate inspection checks to the newly-built facilities. These plans were publicly rejected by Russia's newly-appointed Minister of Defense Anatoliy Serdyukov and Mr. Ivanov (Russia's first-vice-premier). Russia continues to remain skeptical that Iran posesses any type of threat to Russia and to Europe. Similarly, the US, in the face of Ms. Rice has called Russia's concerns over plans to deploy the ABM systems as "ludicrous", the New York Times reported.

In his annual address to parliament, President Putin made it clear that Russia will respond immediately to US plans by withdrawing from the Adapted Conventional Armed Forces Treaty in Europe, which was based on an earlier treaty of 1990 during the dissolution of the Cold War and the Soviet Union. Russia's claims are that it is the only nation to have fully ratified the treaty and refuses to continue to fulfill its obligations unless other members (specifically NATO members) ratify it. NATO today has declared its surprise over such actions as it believes Russia was never fulfilling its promises under the treaty.

Because of numerous confusions in the press, it is important to go back and determine the realities of the treaties. An adapted copy of both treaties (1990) and (1999) can be found on the Arms Control Association Websites. The New York Times reports today that:

The agreement in question, the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, known by the initials C.F.E., was signed in 1990 by the N.A.T.O. nations and the nations of the former Warsaw Pact, including Russia. It required the reduction and relocation of much of the main battle equipment then located along the former east-west dividing line, including tanks, artillery pieces, armored vehicles and attack aircraft. It also established an inspection regime.

Under the treaty, more than 50,000 pieces of military equipment were converted or destroyed by 1995. With its initial ambitions largely achieved, it was renegotiated in 1999, adding a requirement that Russia withdraw its forces from Georgia and Moldova, two former Soviet republics where tensions and intrigue with Moscow run high.

The fact of "force withdrawal" remains very controversial. NATO members in 2002 had accepted that Russia fulfilled all of its requirements under the treaty, specifically regarding the fact of the withdrawal of TPE (treaty prohibited weapons) from Georgia and Moldova and other territories. Russia claims that its obligations essentially stop here, and a withdrawal of forces is a gesture of goodwill; NATO members claim that Russia made promises to withdraw its troops also. The treaty was originally signed to ensure the collective security of Europe and security from a "blitzkrieg-type" attack when one state would concentrate a large number of weapons on another's border. Thus, severe caps on TPEs were implemented (specifically tanks, jet fighters, light-armored vehicles, cannons, etc.) From this, troop presence would not be an issue to collective security, neither would the US ABM bases (a clear missile deterrent system).

In addition to the above, Russia's attempt to withdraw from the treaty is set to completely confuse all negotiating processes, as the treaty seems to be read differently in every country. With Russia having ratified it but slow on implementation, and NATO, having not ratified it accusing Russia of slow progress. Even before Russia's announcement, the Guardian reports that:

The Bush administration has this week been struggling to convince sceptical European partners that the missile shield is a good idea.

In an interview yesterday, Germany's deputy foreign minister, Gernot Erler, revealed that at least six allies, including Germany, raised doubts about the project at a Nato meeting last week — amid fears of another cold war on European soil.

The CFE treaty is not the first treaty Russia has threatened to withdraw from. Russian officials initially opened up their protests by suggesting likely withdrawal from the treaty limiting production of medium-range missiles. It is a paradox that both treaties are virtually outdated, with Russia and US scrapping their medium-range missiles, while six other countries still possess them. With regard to the CFE treaty, the militarization and force-withdrawals have mostly been achieved already, and Russia remains the beneficiary under the treaty due to its massive territory. While other countries had to scrap their weapons, Russia shifted its TPEs beyond the limit-free Urals in Siberia. Yet the treaties are highly symbolic and are the essential foundations of collective security in the post Cold War period.

The Financial Times in its editorial reports that, the US was the first country that began breaking such treaties, through its 2001 unilateral withdrawal from the ABM treaty:

However, Thursday’s decision is strategically important because it signals Russia’s growing readiness to tear up the post-1990 diplomatic order. Moscow believes today’s strong Russia can revisit the deals done in the 1990s by a weak Russia. The Kremlin also argues the US has repeatedly acted unilaterally, including over Iraq and over recent plans for Czech and Polish missile defence bases. If the US can set aside bilateral or multilateral pacts, says Moscow, so can Russia.

These developments take the world into perilous waters. While there is no open ideological conflict between east and west, there are deep differences over democracy and the rule of law. It will be dangerous if these disputes prevent Russia, the European Union and the US co-operating on matters of mutual interest, including energy, the war against terrorism and nuclear non-proliferation.

The US is entitled to look after its own security. But it must accept security is often easier to build in partnership with others than alone. America, not Russia, was the first to pull out of a cold war arms pact when in 2001 it abandoned the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty. Washington’s recent effort to explain its missile defence plans to sceptical European states, including Russia, is long overdue.

Russia is behaving irresponsible in a diplomatic sense and is severely threatening collective security in Europe. But the US is doing the same, yet indirectly. Analysts have rightly pointed out that withdrawal from both treaties will make Russia's position worse: it has barely the right capital to finance development and deployment of medium-range ballistic missiles, and to engage in a large-scale rearmament of its European part. These capabilities are dwarfed by 10 times by the US military budget. But clearly Russia has no choice. Its policy of countering NATO's dominance must start now, at a time when relations are moderately cool. The fact of no ideological difference between the East and the Wets means no serious threat to confrontation will occur. Yet, it is worrisome if Russia and the US scrap its commitments to security in Europe, especially given the experience of the 20th century . We are living in a different world, but relations among countries sour easily, and alliances and counter-alliances form just as fast.

The end goal of its diplomatic game is not to scrap its commitment to European security, but to make the rest of Europe aware that such issues as the ABM deployment if pushed unilaterally by the US without NATO approval could bring instability. Yet, the threats that Russia has made show that it is engaged in almost full-scale bluff, the US knows and understands this, Germany understands this even better. This poker game is very long, and the stakes may rise with every day, unless serious negotiations start soon, Russia will turn its bluff into serious actions. If treaty withdrawal will occur, there is a marginal prospect of US rearmament in Europe, quite an unhappy prospect.