Showing posts with label czech. Show all posts
Showing posts with label czech. Show all posts

Monday, May 07, 2007

The Duel to Come


The Russian hockey team has secured itself a spot in the world championship quarter-finals to face-off against the mighty Czechs, in a match that promises to fulfill its reputation of a fierce battle on ice like the matches between the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia have always been. From 1962 to 1986, only Czechoslovakia was able to beat the Soviet Union in the World Championship finals (and only four times); despite the split-up of the two countries, it is the Czech team that is widely regarded to be the successor of Czechoslovak hockey team.

The Russians beat the Swedes 4-2 on Monday, in a match dominated by powerplays and confrontations; the seemingly even first two quarters ended after the Russians made sure that the puck remained in the area around the goal of the Olympic and world champions in the third quarter. Two goals were secured by the already infamous Kazan "troika" from AK Bars, who many claim resembles the "Superbloc" of the Soviet 80-s hockey team of Larionov, Fetisov, Kasatonov, Krutov, and Makarov. Malkin, of the Pittsburgh Penguins secured a 3-2 lead after hitting a whopper of a shot into the Swedish goal.

Despite the Czech team being comparatively weak in this championship, it is not a sign of an easy game for the Russians. Their legendary defensive play focused on lightning-fast counter-attacks has fooled the Russians many times in the past; most recently last year. Russia is almost forced to win, with the Championship being held in Mosocw, and the game being on Victory Day (May 9th). Anything short will not be acceptable in the eyes of the Russian spectators. Good luck to both teams; we all know who will win!

Thursday, April 19, 2007

ABM Update : Patriot Missiles Again? [Updated April 20th]

The Financial Times reports that the US has recently taken another step forward in progressing its ABM technologies in Europe by opening up an official dialog with NATO members as well as Russia's representatives in Europe:

Thursday, Konstantin Totskiy, Moscow’s ambassador to Nato, underlined Russia’s concerns, but also welcomed the meeting as the start of a long-awaited “dialogue”.

The US delegation argued that the proposed sites in Poland and the Czech Republic would allow the system to cover all but a handful of Nato allies.

The system, which is principally designed to protect the continental US, already uses bases in California and Alaska. According to maps circulating among Nato officials, only Turkey and parts of Greece, Bulgaria and Romania would be outside the system’s protection once additional interceptor missiles were installed in Poland and radar in the Czech Republic.

Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, Nato secretary-general, is enthusiastic about winning Nato support for a complementary “bolt-on” system that would use Patriot missiles and Aegis radar to protect Turkey and other parts of south-east Europe from shorter-range missiles from Iran. <...>

In Moscow, however, Sergei Ivanov, Russia’s first deputy prime minister, said he saw “no grounds” for co-operation with the US on a joint missile defence system.

Once again, I would like to reiterate that I am not a specialist on radar missile defense but it seems strange that Bulgaria and Romania, countries closest to Poland would not be under the protection of the new system.

Second, I do not understand why the United States is not engaged in a dialog with Turkey about deployment of its ABM system there. Geographically, this region still allows to track incoming missiles from Iran, it is also much closer to Iran, and potentially other troublesome countries. Also, Turkey, in the past, has hosted a large variety of US weapons systems.

Tuesday, February 27, 2007

Crumbling Bridges

The expansion of the US ABM shield into Europe, especially into Poland and the Czech Republic, will further shift the balance of security and power in the world over to the side of a single country, a single system of development. The United States is driving a wedge into the current relations between two systems of power in the world, which may be the easiest strategy to ensure the dominance of its system. The United States is pursuing its own national security interests, and it should be applauded for doing so; but its status as a global power and leader of a dominant system gives it responsibility for the security balance in the world as well. Global security and national security are not always intertwined, sometimes there are tradeoffs.

An existing definition of a superpower gives it three characteristics:
· Global economy. An economy with efficient multi-trillion dollar capital markets, which affects significantly the capital markets of other countries. An economy with extensive capacity for overcoming recessions and continuous expansions without hurting the combined wealth of its population.
· Full military self-sufficiency. In other words, the capacity to produce all types of weapons without any significant outside help (whether in terms of knowledge or material resources).
· Ability to impact almost any part of the world, whether economically, politically, militarily, socially; this may be for reasons of promoting a country’s own values, or for protecting national interests.

Despite the fact that today’s global powers are considered to be the US, UK, Germany, France, China, Russia, and Japan, the only country in the world which fully possesses the above characteristics is the United States. It is also apparent that the UK, Germany and France rely to different degrees on the United States for their military production needs, most obviously as a by-product of NATO. The UK, German, and French economies are very heavily intertwined with that of the US (although globalization is reducing the importance of this aspect). Some would debate the alignment of political views of the European countries with the US, but the views converge on most issues of national and global security in the long-run. Consequently, it seems evident that the US is the dominant country in the US/UK/France/Germany system.

The remaining countries are China, Russia, and Japan. Japan, while clearly not tied as strong to the US, as the European countries, is of a similar nature. However, its only strength is an independent global economy, which does not give it much leeway as a system on its own.

Russia and China, to various degrees, possess all of the three characteristics at a “discount” to the scale of the US (except for Russian military self-sufficiency, roughly on par with the US). Yet, these countries are undoubtedly not aligned with each other on their global outlooks; their national interests conflict each other more often than not. China and Russia have enough power and independence to be enlisted as two additional systems.

The ideological differences between the three systems are not as dominant as they were during the Cold War, but it is important to note them; each system’s ideological structure is a variation of capitalism. The US system, a form of progressive democratic capitalism; the Russian system a form of democratic capitalism with a large interest of a centralized government, and the Chinese system a form of capitalism controlled by a highly centralized government system.

The presence of three systems ensures a multi-polar world, with a significant dominance of one system. The realpolitik nature of the relationships amongst the systems makes the end goal complete dominance.

The actions of the US in the past 15 years thus seem perfectly obvious and justified, as the actions of a system trying to win full dominance. In an environment where full-scale military conflicts are impossible, the only way to beat a system is to contain it enough to continue reaping its resources, but preventing it from exerting influence upon your system.

The expansion of NATO to cover the entire Western border of Russia, the stirring up of ex-Soviet republics and support for their inclusion into the US system, are tools to prevent all Russia exporting its influence. The US system’s corporate expansion into Russia’s key assets (oil, gas, mining) and prevention of Russian corporate expansion into global downstream markets is the simultaneous reaping of resources and barrier set-up to prevent reciprocal influence. Of course, companies that attempt to expand into Russia’s key resources are not governmental companies, but the US system promotes indirectly an expansion of the US system’s economy into Russia, while promoting the barriers for Russian corporations in Europe. This has happened with Gazprom’s attempts to access the downstream market, Rosneft’s (Russian oil giant) failed attempt to get full-scale access to European capital markets. In return, Shell, BP, Exxon-Mobil, are all present in significant oil and gas projects on Russian territory.

It is self-explanatory why Russia promotes, almost openly, the expelling of foreign corporations from its strategic assets. It sees a threat to its national security. Tying these actions with an authoritarian regime is an attempt to shift blame; Russia’s actions if it were to ignore total foreign dominance of its key assets would be considered self-destructive and overly loyal to an indefinite country.

The primary reason why Mr. Khodorkovsky, hailed by many in 2004 as the champion of Russian democracy, is sitting in jail, is that he exerted political ambitions while simultaneously trying to sell the nation’s top oil firm (with a 20% stake in the total oil assets of Russia) to ExxonMobil. In response to warnings from the Kremlin, Mr. Khodorkovsky claimed that he was all-powerful. No government in the world likes to be spat on by a high-stakes businessman. The Kremlin was in a position where it was obliged to establish a majority (by no means complete) control over the nation’s strategic assets, if it wanted to have leeway over the economy, rather than be a subsidiary to Wall Street/London City. The United States behaved in the same way to the acquisition attempt by CNOOC (China) of Unocal (a mid-size oil exploration company).

Similarly, actions of an expanding NATO, under any pretext, are seen by Russia as a threat to its national security. Russia does not have many existing resources, apart from strong relations with several European countries, Middle East and Iran, as well as its expanding economy and self-sufficient military system. It attempts to hold on to its existing resources and build on them at all costs. The presence of US ABM shields in Europe served, as US generals claim, to locate and destroy only a few dozen rockets, will not be a threat to Russia within the next ten years. But, a shield against ten rockets can be expanded to 50, 100, and so on. Once the resource is there, no additional hurdles such as the need to gain global consent, or investments into infrastructure are required – simple expansion is easier and cheaper. Russia is concerned about what guarantees exist that the shield will not be anti-Russian in twenty years.

The US in 1999 guaranteed Russia that NATO would stop expanding, but the expansion continues. Russia feels it is being ignored, being given false promises, when NATO is expanding, and when new NATO members carry large-scale projects set to defend the US from multiple-nuclear-warhead attacks; attacks, which could currently come only from Russia and China.

It is of course unquestioned that the club of countries that could threaten the US with weapons is expanding with passing time. India and Pakistan, who each possess such weapons in the Kashmir “powder-keg” zone is a worry for the US especially. The relative weakness of the Pakistani regime, the closeness to a hotbed of terrorism in the face of Afghanistan, the ever-expanding Indian economy, every year becoming more and more tied with US businesses mean that a conflict in the region will deal a powerful blow to American interests in that region. Iran currently does not have such weapons, but will in the near future. The shield will indeed protect the interests of the US system in the world from the rogue states, and give it much more negotiating power on the global arena, but no guarantees are in place as to the possible redirection or expansion of this shield, nor can these guarantees be given to Russia.

Russia will most likely be unwilling to pursues such guarantees; it will do all it can to prevent as much as possible the ABM shield in Poland and the Czech Republic. Another reason behind Russia’s attitude can be attributed to the fact that, over the past years, Russia has shut-down two radio-tracking bases, used in its defenses, in Cuba and Vietnam. The official reasoning was the inability to finance these two bases, whose cost was around $500 million annually; a reason which can be put into question, with Russia’s GDP having passed the $1 trillion mark, and simple government oil revenues hitting $200 billion. My assumption is that Russia was given certain guarantees, pushed to close down the bases. If this assumption stands, the expansion of the ABM shield (which includes radio-tracking bases) into Eastern Europe means Russia has given up too much, the promises made to it were false.

Many journalists and political analysts claim that Russia’s reaction to the establishment of the shield, gives Poland and the Czech Republic more reasons to ally with the US and create the ABM shields. First of all, this is an indirect affirmation of the ABM shield’s aim against Russia. Secondly, it is the US which is driving in the wedge between the two systems; the US is defending itself on a major scale, set to outpace the potential threat of an attack from a military superpower. The two systems are driven further apart.

Russia cannot continue agreeing with the expansion of the US system, if no guarantees will exist that the expansion will stop. Russia will most likely be forced to expand its own system at the expense of an alliance with the US. Neither the US system nor the Russian system will benefit from the greater wedge. It seems the US’s benefits from the implementation of the “sanitary cordon” around Russia will not outweigh the costs. The costs would be continued confrontation of the two systems, which would hamper the solution of the world’s global problems, expand the activities of unstable regimes, rogue states, which will pursue a double-game as they did during the Cold War.

Iran’s current double-game pursuit is the most obvious example. Neither Russia’s “all-clear” position, nor the US’s “restrict-all” approach is helpful, but as long as two positions remain, Iran remains in relative safety. Currently there is room for compromise, as the US system and Russia have a lot of mutually dependent issues that they could solve by compromising on Iran. But as time runs by, and relations continue to deteriorate, the compromising could stop. And Iran-s will pop-up all over the world like bamboo trees.

Bottom line: now is not too late to rethink the structure of inter-system relations. Neither system should dominate; each system has the responsibility to keep it that way.